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A ‘society . . . divisible into the blessed and the
unblessed’: Michael Young and Meritocracy in
Postwar Britain
STEPHEN MEREDITH
Abstract
‘Meritocracy’ continues to unfold as both core conceptual framework and political ideal of
the language of social mobility. In recent decades, politicians of various hues have declared
it a sine qua non of the so-called ‘classless society’. The longer trajectory of postwar discourses
of equality reveal a more chequered conceptual past. Its origins in the forums of revisionist
social democracy of the 1950s, and subsequently popularised in the writings of social demo-
cratic polymath, Michael Young, are much more circumspect. The article considers pivotal
contributions and developments of this conceptual history and trajectory. It considers the ori-
gins and emergence of meritocracy as a dimension of discourses of equality in the 1950s, and
the formative contribution of Michael Young, reaction and responses on the left to his 1958
seminal work, The Rise of the Meritocracy, and the subsequent ‘meritocratic turn’. In spite of
its satirical origins and warnings of dire social consequences, meritocracy presently enjoys a
confirmatory position as a concept of opportunity and social mobility, as an embedded ideal
of social organisation and means of allocating differential rewards.
Keywords: Michael Young, meritocracy, opportunity, social mobility, equality, social democracy
Introduction
DEBATES CONCERNING the centrality of meri-
tocracy to contemporary discourses and poli-
cies of social mobility have been reheated
recently by Theresa May’s (since diluted)
plans to reconsider an embargo on new gram-
mar schools. Her announcement in September
2016 suggested that it was part of an ambi-
tious prospectus for Britain to become the
‘world’s great meritocracy’. The emphasis on
access to selective grammar schools and their
provision of opportunity and potentially
greater social mobility is a means by which to
‘build a country that truly works for every-
one, not just the privileged few’.1 Likewise,
Sajid Javid recently described his ideal ‘Tory-
ism’ as one which challenges establishments,
‘radical’ and ‘meritocratic’. Directly referenc-
ing Michael Young’s incongruously paradig-
matic meritocratic formula, he believes that in
a changing Britain from the 1980s ‘new
opportunities awaited bright people who
worked hard’; it enabled his own trajectory
from purportedly Britain’s ‘most dangerous
street’ to Home Secretary. The primary role of
his party should be to revive and consolidate
the key message of this narrative, and herein
lies something of the debate over egalitarian
ethics and means, locked within and deter-
mined by narrow contours of ‘meritocracy’.2
Debates and arguments of meritocracy
have been a recurrent theme of postwar Bri-
tish politics. Meritocracy as favoured model
of social organisation and economic and
technological progress has enjoyed enhanced
contemporary status. Notably (and problem-
atically for Young himself), it was a concep-
tual staple of Tony Blair’s New Labour
governments as both object and tool of pol-
icy, but has been a consistent, often tacit,
conceptual dimension of arguments against
attempts to reform the selective component
of the postwar educational framework. Cam-
paigning against Labour’s comprehensive
reorganisation from the mid-1960s, former
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Conservative one-nation group founder and
future Thatcherite ‘convert’, Angus Maude,
for instance, agonised over reform of selec-
tive education and grammar schools (as
engines of meritocracy). While willing to
concede reform of ‘over-rigid 11-plus selec-
tion’, removal of ‘all selection’ in favour of
‘strait-jacket uniformity’ would make it
impossible to identify the ‘special talents and
abilities of every child’ and to deliver educa-
tional needs accordingly. Lack of pluralism
in educational opportunities would threaten
standards and the ‘quality of . . . education,
and the whole future of our economy and
technology’.3
Numerous critics, building on Young’s
original dystopian vision, alternatively
emphasise the limitations and potential
disharmony of a model of organisation and
‘equality’ based on narrow, selective oppor-
tunities and routes to mobility. Recent stud-
ies show that, apart from the USA, Britain
has some of the lowest levels of social mobil-
ity in the developed world, producing gener-
ational stasis, as well as problems of
unfulfilled talent and a socially detached and
disinterested elite.4 Critics of the meritocratic
platform underline its propensity to create
and consolidate (new) ‘elites’ and entrench
(new) social divisions based on narrow selec-
tion and allocation of rewards. An inevitable
by-product of meritocratic competition is
that those disadvantaged by its restrictive
criteria face social inequality, as those able to
navigate obligatory ‘intelligence’ and ‘effort’
tests are rewarded. Without embedded justi-
fications for ‘failure’ of a system skewed in
favour of inherited status, meritocracy repro-
duces social divisions of an even more exclu-
sionary and unforgiving form.
The political status of meritocracy has
undergone significant postwar revision—
from its pejorative roots in Young’s original
satirical depiction, to an embedded contem-
porary ideal of social organisation and deter-
minant of individual social and economic
mobility and status. For advocates, it offers
an alternative, less select and more dynamic
and competitive approach to opportunity
and mobility than traditionally elitist, class-
based patterns of social organisation and
relationships. For critics, opposed to both its
focus on a narrow set of ‘academic’ attri-
butes and implications or preference for
particular forms of organisation, its ascen-
dancy reinforces elitist and individualistic
assumptions of neoliberal hegemony. It
imposes equally divisive social patterns
rather than the prospect of genuine and
inclusive opportunity and mobility for all.
The article considers something of the con-
ceptual history of meritocracy in postwar
Britain. It addresses the formative contribu-
tion of Michael Young to the origins and
emergence of meritocracy as a dimension of
egalitarian discourse, and reaction and
responses to his 1958 seminal work, The Rise
of the Meritocracy. In spite of his original
warning and satirical intent, meritocracy has
enjoyed a chequered career as a concept of
social mobility and equality and, to Young’s
apparent dismay, its interpretation has
shifted often indiscriminately to represent an
embedded ideal of social organisation and
means of allocating differential rewards.
The origins of a concept: Michael
Young and his contemporaries
Although Young is generally credited with
introducing the term to popular discourse,
discussions of meritocracy as both concept
and dilemma of social equality appear to
have evolved in a wider intellectual milieu
from the mid-1950s. The concept itself
appears to have formally surfaced in the
pages of the primarily social democratic jour-
nal, Socialist Commentary, in a May 1956 arti-
cle by industrial sociologist and industrial
relations expert, Alan Fox, and emerges very
largely as a form of social organisation to be
avoided at the risk of significant social costs.
Its egalitarian credentials, argued Fox, were
limited and potentially counter-productive.
Effectively, it would do little to reduce ‘strat-
ification’ based on ‘occupational status’.
Indisputable natural ‘law’ would determine
disproportionate reward of the talented at
the expense of those ostensibly less gifted. It
would result in a division of the ‘blessed
and the unblessed—those who get the best
and most of everything, and those who get
the poorest and the least. This way lies the
“meritocracy”’. Meritocratic attempts to
merely devise bigger and better ‘sieves’ to
achieve wider forms of ‘opportunity’ would
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not resolve ‘extremes of occupational status’
and ancillary social divisions they produce
and sustain. As such, it offered little more
than the ‘vision of a certain brand of New
Conservatism’ rather than a ‘vision of social-
ism’.5
The extent to which a society organised on
such a basis supported wider objectives of
economic and technical ‘progress’ remained
an equally moot point. The ‘economic’
dimension of meritocracy produced domi-
nant views of ‘big rewards for enterprise,
big incentives and differentials to stimulate
effort and initiative’ and ‘greatly superior
status’ for these groups. Alternatively, it was
not inconceivable that economic progress is
constrained by meritocratic social organisa-
tion and divisions and potentially ‘obstruc-
tive attitudes’ they produce. Potentially
different forms of social organisation held
out the prospect of more ‘positive co-opera-
tion’ of workers in productivity and techni-
cal change. Notwithstanding, they offered
the prospect of more equitable distribution
of resources and better quality of life and
happier society for all compatible with the
‘ethical’ basis of British socialism. It was not
incontrovertible that an ‘aristocracy . . . of
personal endowment’ was ethically superior
to an ‘aristocracy . . . of birth’.6
German-American political philosopher
and theorist, Hannah Arendt, similarly ges-
tated and presented a critique of meritocracy
at the point of first publication of Young’s
opus in 1958. In a celebrated critique of both
traditional and ‘progressive’ pedagogies,
which appears to have begun life as a 1954
lecture and essay and formally published in
1958, she primarily intended an examination
of perspectives of the allegedly declining
standards of American education, but also
explored something of its comparative con-
text and development. While she argued that
secondary education in the US was often
inadequate preparation for further study,
this was not necessarily or inevitably a result
of mass education and she was equally criti-
cal of the new narrowly selective system of
its British counterpart. The ‘dreaded’ 11-plus
examination, as filter of the ‘ten per cent’ of
grammar school entrants and those destined
for ‘higher education’, was the engine of a
‘meritocracy’ (and impossible to introduce at
the time in America in such a ‘rigorous’
manner). It reflected ‘once more the estab-
lishment of an oligarchy’, this time ‘not of
wealth or birth but of talent’. Under its
regime, Britain will continue to be governed
in all circumstances ‘neither as . . . monarchy
nor as . . . democracy but as . . . oligarchy or
aristocracy’ of the ‘most gifted’. The trend to
institutionalised meritocracy legitimises com-
paratively ‘intolerable’ and ‘almost physical
division of . . . children into gifted and
ungifted’ according to narrowly selective
measures of ability. As such, it ‘contradicts
. . . principle[s] of equality [and] equalitarian
democracy no less than any other oligarchy’.
As the new ‘oligarchy’ of the future, the
‘meritocracy not the democracy’—or a new,
‘legitimate’ aristocracy of genuine ‘talent’
and ‘merit’, self-belief and virtue—influence
key decisions in their own image and to
their own further reward.7
The concept and argument against meri-
tocracy received wider circulation and cur-
rency with the publication of Michael
Young’s tract on the dangers of a prospec-
tively hardened meritocracy. In The Rise of
the Meritocracy, Young imagined a fictional
future society characterised by the emer-
gence of a new class, fuelled through the
meritocratic thrust of educational reform and
its intrinsic early competitive selection pro-
cess. He counselled against the social conse-
quences of a society developed and ordered
on narrow meritocratic principles. Rather
than remove elitism and barriers to attain-
ment, the resulting ‘meritocracy’ would sim-
ply transform the pattern of inequalities,
arguably more pervasive, pernicious and
divisive than those grounded in differences
of class alone. Echoing Fox’s concerns, more
profound principles of cooperation, commu-
nity and equality would remain neglected
and unfulfilled.
Young’s own ethical vision of social organ-
isation, later reflected in much of his own
‘social entrepreneurship’, embraced more
inclusive and cooperative philosophy. Echo-
ing concerns of inevitable stratification of
those such as Fox, he offered a manifesto of
the genuinely pluralistic ‘classless society’
(subsequently critiqued in a review by Fox
himself as inattentive to the meritocratic
appeal of value in particular skill-sets in the
market). Here, people are evaluated ‘not
only according to their intelligence and their
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education, their occupations and their
power, but according to their kindliness and
their courage, their imagination and sensitiv-
ity, their sympathy and their generosity’.
Who would say that the ‘scientist was supe-
rior to the porter . . . the civil servant to the
lorry-driver with unusual skills’, the aca-
demic to the carer or nurse? A ‘pluralistic
society’ would be tolerant, diverse and non-
conformist, in which ‘individual differences
were actively encouraged . . . Every human
being would then have equal opportunity,
not to rise up in the world in the light of
any mathematical measure, but to develop
his or her own special capacities for leading
a full life’.8
Young’s satirical and pessimistic portrayal
of meritocracy—as thin and contracted and
defensive ‘opportunity’—was founded on
both the nature of his own conceptual
thought, which privileged an ethical social-
ism of fellowship and cooperation, and
engagement with emerging social research
themes of family, community and mutual-
ism. His vision of ‘egalitarian’ social change
grounded in narrowly defined and accessible
‘merit’ disappointed his broader communi-
tarian philosophy. He departed from the
broader revisionist social democratic empha-
sis on narrowly defined ‘equality’, pursued
through largely statist means, in favour of a
‘smaller-scale politics-of-cooperation’ and
fuller interpretation of ‘opportunity’ in a plu-
ral society. While not fundamentally
opposed to the revisionist dictum of equality
as the centrepiece of Labour’s story, ques-
tions of what it means and how to get there
were far less clear. Young was acutely aware
of the dangers of an unmediated meritocratic
‘equality of opportunity’, as his famous
satire demonstrates.
Anthony Crosland had already signalled
his own qualified concern over the ‘unfair-
ness’ of narrowly meritocratic distribution of
rewards (no doubt from discussions with
Young, whose views were broadly similar) in
his major 1956 revisionist text, The Future of
Socialism. He conceded that an ‘aristocracy of
talent’ improved on ‘hereditary aristocracy’ as
a concept of ‘social justice’, and that some
degree of ‘differential’ reward for those of
‘greater ability’ had practical purpose.
Nonetheless, if ‘privileges’ were so large ‘as to
create a distinct elite, differently educated and
socially select, it must be regarded as an
unpleasant concession to economic efficiency’.
To reward intelligence disproportionately
over other attributes of human experience, as
the basis of (re)creating conditions of ‘extreme
inequality’, appeared to contradict principles
of a ‘just society’ as the ‘fundamental ethical
case against any elite or aristocracy’.9
While both Crosland and Young identified
meritocratic principles as an entrenchment of
‘formal equality of opportunity’ grounded in
narrow and exclusive criteria, and a potential
source of new ‘social discrimination’, Young
was more explicit in his belief that socialism
was as much about ‘fraternity’. Without fra-
ternity, it was more likely that the new ten-
dency to equality of opportunity would ‘end
up creating a heartless meritocracy without a
trace of noblesse oblige and dismissive of the
needs and claims of those who failed to make
the grade’. Without a fraternal critique of mer-
itocracy, postwar society would succeed only
in substituting elites.10 Young popularised
both the concept and embodiment of the con-
sequences of pursuit of an unsentimental
‘equality of opportunity’, which had been a
recent subject of critical discussion within the
wider salons of revisionist social democracy.
He echoed the emphasis on ‘fellowship’ of the
revisionist and communitarian Socialist
Union to which he was closely linked, and
which reflected an emerging distinction of
social democracy between those focussed on
simple distributive objectives and those who
favoured a more cooperative model and
organisation. The latter’s 1956 group publica-
tion, Twentieth Century Socialism, addressed
limitations of a ‘liberal conception of equality’
and ‘opportunity’ interpreted merely as an
‘equal start’. If it is not concerned with the
‘whole bundle of opportunities which society
distributes through a lifetime’ and responsive
to ‘different capacities and needs’, selective
and preferential characteristics or abilities
favour some over others in a ‘race left to the
swiftest’.11 Young designated this the ‘meri-
tocracy’.
The Rise of the Meritocracy:
reception and critique
Young’s paradigmatic text was essentially a
diagnostic contribution to wider debates of
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social democracy in the 1950s over the inter-
pretation and operation of its newly pro-
moted organising principle. It disputed the
notion that an arrangement grounded in nar-
row opportunity was sufficient. It would
serve only to focus finite resources and
attendant status in the hands of the ‘meritoc-
racy’, a fortunate minority equipped with
saleable abilities in the ‘public market’, and
confer additional rewards on those already
endowed. Following initial publication, the
book induced a range of critical notices and
responses and wider discussion of the rela-
tive value of ‘merit’ as a tool of social equal-
ity and likely trajectory and impact of
contemporary developments in education
and social change.
Reaction to The Rise of the Meritocracy
acknowledged its essential egalitarian mes-
sage. Describing it as ‘harsh and pessimistic’
in the dimensions of its nightmare, Labour
researcher and future Cabinet minister, Peter
Shore, also recognised its potential for misin-
terpretation. It was, he concluded, ‘certainly
not implausible’ and represented a ‘reason-
able projection of Mr Butler’s Opportunity
State’. He saw it not as an unadulterated ‘ar-
gument against the selection of talent, still less
a defence of inherited privilege’, but a plea
that ‘equality be more than opportunity’. It
should also embrace ‘power, education and
income’, and ‘should be made the ruling prin-
ciple of social order’, as the means to a ‘better
society . . . not just a more efficient one’.12
Alan Fox, again writing in Socialist Com-
mentary, this time as commentator rather
than progenitor, cited the text in a long line
of dystopian fiction and social commentary
—including Huxley, Koestler, Orwell and
James Burnham’s chronicle of the relentless
rise of a managerial class—which served
society’s seemingly pathological need of fre-
quent nightmare projections of itself. In
Young’s case, it exhorted the further ‘spectre’
of meritocracy, and this time we should sit
up and take notice. He identifies common
preoccupation with the dangers of a society
in which unmediated meritocracy, masked
as ‘equality of opportunity’ and uncritically
cultivated by a complicit Labour Party, offers
mobility, status and reward to a ‘scientifi-
cally’ selected and segregated few of produc-
tive ‘intelligence’. By contrast, an
‘unproductive’ class is marginalised in a
system of rigid stratification, determined by
narrow merit-based ‘opportunity’, and more
acutely aware than ever of its ‘own demon-
strable inferiority’.13
Fox was, however, less sanguine about
Young’s ostensibly less radical prescriptions,
based on an alternative social philosophy of
‘plural values’. While it was no doubt laud-
able that the ‘Manifesto’ of the ‘classless soci-
ety’ should imbibe broader markers of social
value—not just ‘intelligence and . . . educa-
tion’ and ‘occupation and . . . power’, but
‘kindliness and courage’, ‘imagination and . . .
generosity’, the lorry driver and rose grower,
as well as the scientist— it would do little to
downgrade inevitable meritocratic appeal.
While Young’s ‘plural values’ may go some
way to determining the ‘worth of a society’,
they ‘do not fetch much’ in its public market-
place. Inevitably, a ‘clever-boy’s paradise’
remains so long as it is deemed a precondition
of economic or technological development,
and its terms are replicated and embedded in
society. Corresponding forms of social stratifi-
cation are inevitable, and the essential chal-
lenge remains to ‘minimise the gaps and
maximise the links between the strata’. As
such, it was unlikely that manipulation of out-
comes through the education system could be
brokered against vested interests in a society
forced by economic imperatives to confront
and submit to the precepts of meritocracy. It
was also unlikely that educational reform
alone could take the strain if extremes of
income and ownership persisted and as the
socioeconomic effects of incipient meritocracy
hardened.
Nonetheless, with its potential (mis)appli-
cation to the new political rhetoric of ‘equal-
ity of opportunity’ and the ‘classless society’,
a language identified by Young through his
narrator, with ‘opportunity . . . coupled with
equality’ the Holy Grail of recent social
invention, it offered both political apologue
and cautionary tale. The so-called ‘Opportu-
nity State’ had become the ‘politicians’
equivalent to chastity. All of them are in
favour . . . from Mr. Bevan to Mr. Butler . . .
They disagree only about the shortest cut’.
This is what the country now wanted. Or
was it? Conservative critics, such as Charles
Curran in Encounter magazine, wondered if
Young’s allegorical message was exagger-
ated. Why would those excluded from the
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meritocracy ‘by I.Q. alone’ tolerate their own
exclusion, and would they not rise in revolt
far earlier than predicted in Young’s ‘fable of
2034’? Young’s imagined society in which
full equality of opportunity becomes institu-
tionalised was a ‘philoprogenitive’ impossi-
bility, given the centrality and protective
capacity of the family unit. Far from seeking
a hard meritocracy, historically, socially and
increasingly demographically people wanted
a ‘society that protects and cares for the
untalented many’, and in which the
‘ungifted majority can survive and flourish’.
Young’s was a ‘gross oversimplification’ of
the uncontested arena of meritocracy, and
involved selective use of ‘tendencies in con-
temporary Britain’ in a ‘sociological sleight-
of-hand’. Insulated by embedded characteris-
tics of British society, the British ‘lower
classes need not start advertising for a Spar-
tacus just yet’.14
While arguably a reasoned criticism of
Young on publication in 1958, ostensible ‘ne-
oliberal’ developments of a later meritocratic
turn appeared to remove some of the com-
pound sociological barriers to attainment of
meritocracy. As David Kynaston suggests,
even if their early numbers and initial
potency were exaggerated, Young was offer-
ing more than ‘construction of a meritocratic
straw man’. By virtue of ‘their own endeav-
ours . . . as opposed to socio-economic back-
ground and connection’, in a system of
intelligence testing and selection for societal
roles, the new meritocrats ‘were on the
march’ from the 1950s. Young’s analysis was
‘tapping into’ very real social trends and, by
utilising the terminology of meritocracy, pro-
vided a useful conceptual lens through
which these developments could be viewed
and appraised.15
Young’s ‘neologism’ raised the spectre of
the emergence of an ‘IQ elite’ of postwar Bri-
tish society and economy or, as sociologist
and cultural critic, Richard Hoggart, termed
it, a new ‘aristocracy of brains’ or talent.16
Even Curran was forced to concede the con-
temporary relevance and impression of
Young’s intervention. By ‘calling his end-of-
rainbow State a “meritocracy”, he . . . coined a
valuable new word’, and provided a ‘shibbo-
leth to test the tongue of every aspirant to
power’ in modern Britain.17 It prompted
reviewers and commentators to consider
questions of whether something akin to mer-
itocracy had already emerged, the extent to
which it was or would become embedded,
and whether such a form of social organisa-
tion was desirable, necessary or could be
avoided. Like Arendt, they deliberated the
balance to be achieved between imperatives
of economic and technological competition
and efficiency, and potentially ‘anti-demo-
cratic’ impulses of meritocracy.
While Curran identified traditional socio-
logical cleavages and barriers to the consoli-
dation of meritocracy to the exclusion of
existing social patterns and dispositions,
Welsh Marxist theorist and critic, Raymond
Williams, was similarly unconvinced by the
reach of the new meritocracy. While a large
number of professional roles were increas-
ingly allocated on ‘educational merit’, this
did not unduly disrupt existing patterns of
political power. He saw little evidence in
contemporary Britain of ‘power being more
closely connected with merit, in any defini-
tion’. Power remained ‘largely elsewhere,
and no damned merit about it’. The new
meritocrats merely represented a type of ‘up-
per servant’ class, ‘which may be as high as
they can reasonably expect to travel’.18 From
different perspectives, existing social struc-
tures and practices and processes of democ-
racy would head off the rise and
entrenchment of unmitigated meritocracy.
In contrast, much of the initial response to
Young’s representation of meritocracy pre-
dicted its inevitability, with more or less
enthusiasm and very largely from the com-
mon position on grounds of economic effi-
ciency, competition and growth. The
Economist described the meritocracy as an
‘odious place’, in which ‘mania for capital
expansion’ diminishes requirements of ‘hu-
man welfare’ and ‘economic productivity
rules the ends of human society’, but in one
form or another is on its way. Even the most
rigid comprehensive education, as long as it
does not flatten ability, is unlikely to ‘keep
that ability in the working class’. As such,
the meritocracy represented an ‘elite of top
people, no longer encumbered with heredi-
tary . . . dumb-clucks’ overseeing a ‘new and
paradoxically wide-open, caste system’.19
From the right, the inevitability and promise
of meritocracy were more enthusiastically
embraced. The Times observed positively
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that ‘for the first time . . . we are advancing
ability wherever it is found’. If our ‘eco-
nomic survival depends on discovering and
promoting’ the best talent, there is ‘no get-
ting away from the rise of the meritocracy in
a scientific world’. Young’s conception of
comprehensive schooling of a common cur-
riculum for all children would not remove
cleavages in society, as ‘such schools would
still be selective instruments’. The Spectator
urged that the text addressed the most fun-
damental of postwar developments and con-
cerns, but that Young was ‘dilatory in
shouldering his pole [for] the banner of
Social Mobility’.20 The competitive demands
of economic growth, industrial, and technical
development, required the production of the
type of academic elite and subsequent meri-
tocracy Young looked to proscribe.
From anti-meritocratic impulse to
the meritocratic turn
Young’s was an attempt to offer an extrap-
olative account of credible developments
and costs of postwar social trends which,
through its core concept, has been widely
influential, with both welcome and not so
welcome political consequences. Its influence
in educational reform and attempts to reduce
the impact of social division fostered
through narrow selection and segregated
opportunities has not reduced its operative
predictive capacity and frequent (mis)appro-
priation. In spite of some academic criticism
of its method and style, it offered both
insightful writing on the drivers of educa-
tional structures and policies and ‘sociologi-
cal analysis in the form of . . . satire’, the
central concept of which has attained and
retained civic currency and application (in
both intended and unintended ways).
As a satirical, but full-frontal assault on
the nascent meritocratic compulsion of post-
war education and economic policy, it argu-
ably had most practical influence in the
1960s and 1970s. It provided an ‘important
intellectual propellant’ of the challenge to 11-
plus streaming and consequently the domi-
nant position of grammar schools. Influenced
by Young, Anthony Crosland, as Labour’s
Secretary of State for Education and Science
after 1964, famously declared to his wife
following dinner with the ‘Joint 4’ teachers’
associations his desire to ‘destroy every fuck-
ing grammar school in England . . . And
Wales. And Northern Ireland’ (Scotland was
beyond his charge). His government took
comprehensive schooling beyond the pre-
serve of local initiatives to a broader princi-
ple of policy to be rolled out nationally.
Whatever views of its readiness, ambition or
outcomes (and there are numerous criticisms
of its relative quality, public support and
propensity to ‘lock’ pupils into backgrounds
as effectively as its predecessor), Young had
implanted an ‘anti-meritocratic’ seed. In
addition to helping to ‘abolish the 11-plus’,
Young’s conceptual analysis ‘made the left
think more carefully about equal opportunity
and prompted more support for a pluralistic
society’.21
Young projected his original concept of
meritocracy almost as the antithesis of wider,
inclusive, egalitarian reform and objectives.
Paradoxically, it has come to represent both
the desirable and functional model of socioe-
conomic organisation and reward, and key
means of ‘progressive’ social change. This
latter transformation of its meaning and
application has served to underline both the
prescience and durability of his analysis.
Prior trends towards organisational stan-
dardisation have been reversed without
notions of ‘unstreamed’, mixed-ability
schools and classes having ever achieved full
acceptance. Following the election of the
‘arch-meritocrat’, Margaret Thatcher, in 1979,
a gradual ‘popular’ transition back to a prin-
cipally meritocratic ethos (if it ever disap-
peared) and organisation occurred from the
mid-1980s, and the bitter debate over the rel-
ative economic and social dimensions and
priorities of meritocratic selection continues
to this day. In the ‘ups and downs of . . .
meritocracy’, it appeared that by the end of
the 1970s the ‘book’s political message had
had its day. The task was complete: the mer-
itocracy had been shafted’, but a politician
or politics ‘in the grip of an idea’ can be a
‘dangerous’ thing.22
Arguably, this does not justly acknowl-
edge the wider circulation of ideas and
applications of meritocracy which supported
a broader meritocratic turn from the 1970s.
As early as 1972, for instance, American
political sociologist, Daniel Bell, presented
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the ‘logic’ of a new ‘post-industrial society’
as that of meritocracy underpinning a shift
to the new ‘knowledge economy’. Under cer-
tain tempered conditions, this would consti-
tute a ‘meritocracy . . . of the just’. Politicians
of all shades have since drawn similar con-
clusions over potential ‘conflicts with other
social objectives’ if meritocratic principles of
differential rewards to stimulate ‘productive
wealth’ are left untapped. These arguments
of priorities appear to have neglected Bell’s
secondary or corresponding ‘fairness princi-
ple’, on which the differences are not con-
verted into ‘large, discrepant material and
social advantages’ and society remains gen-
uinely open to the fullest possible extent.23
Intellectually and politically, Young’s origi-
nally dissonant concept has enjoyed a come-
back, this time as a ‘positive’—pervasive and
persuasive—means by which to market the
language of mobility and attendant financial
and social rewards, differentials of which are
increasingly and palpably visible.
Conclusion
Young intended his original satirical concept
to presage the dangers of the rise of a new
elitism based on a ‘narrow band of values’,
a warning he believed has been lost on, or
unheeded by, politicians who have not read
his book. Reflecting on the evolution of his
central concept at the beginning of the new
millennium, he believed much of what he
had predicted had come to pass. For Young,
meritocracy had achieved new legitimacy
and added potency through association with
the recent politics of the centre-left and
wider narratives and institutions of equality,
which has served only to underwrite the
shifting interpretive terrain of his concept as
an indispensable ‘means of breaking down
established hierarchies of privilege’. He was
disappointed to see it embraced as a posi-
tive egalitarian philosophy and guide to
public policy by Tony Blair and New
Labour.
While manifold political advocates con-
tinue to laud the ‘fairness’ of social organisa-
tion which rewards resources of intelligence
and effort, its critics emphasise its essentially
‘neoliberal’ features of individualism and
competition in the guise of ‘opportunity for
all’ and embodied in ‘parables of progress’.
They argue that opportunities for many are
effectively closed down by defensive and
protective tendencies of meritocracy, with a
concomitant hardening of and desensitisation
to social inequalities. Rather than disrupting
pyramids of ‘success’ and status, meritocracy
merely replaces and reproduces those hierar-
chies. Meritocratic social mobility for a nar-
rowly ‘talented’ and subsequently self-
serving elite does not offer an egalitarian
panacea. Rather, it produces its own order in
which those who succeed rehearse the claim
that they have meritoriously applied their
intelligence and effort to the exclusion of
those deemed not to have made the grade
and to the further strain of the social fabric.
Unlike Conservative and New Labour repre-
sentations of the so-called ‘classless society’,
Young believed that meritocracy ‘narrows
potential rather than widens it; treats the less
intelligent as inferior, rather than as individ-
uals with their own [different] talents’. Con-
temporary narratives of meritocracy have
enabled a society stratified by ‘merit’, in
which the ‘poor and disadvantaged’ have
been ‘done down’. Branded at school ‘ac-
cording to education’s narrow band of val-
ues’, they become even ‘more vulnerable for
later unemployment’. They are ‘easily . . .
demoralised by being looked down on so
woundingly by [those] who have done well
for themselves. It is hard . . . in a society that
makes so much of merit to be judged as hav-
ing none. No underclass has ever been left
as morally naked as that’.24
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